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Torts: Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp. - Are You Satis-
fied? Oklahoma's Rigid Application of the One Satisfac-
tion Rule Is Not So Rigid Anymore
L Introduction
When the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp.,' it
forever altered the application of the one satisfaction rule in Oklahoma. As early
as 1949, the court recognized the implicit shortcomings of the rule.' However, prior
to the Kirkpatrick decision in 1996, the court was disinclined to depart from prior
case law advocating strict adherence to the rule. Statutory modifications, persuasive
authority, the court's desire to recognize the true intent of the legislature, and a
general consensus regarding the antiquated nature of the one satisfaction rule have
prompted the court's actions in Kirkpatrick.
The Kirkpatrick court takes a significant and necessary step in limiting the
unintended, yet harmful, effects of the one satisfaction rule in Oklahoma. The court
makes a vital distinction between the rendering of a judgment, whether achieved
through actual adjudication or other means, and the full and complete satisfaction
of a plaintiffs claim. Specifically, the court recognizes the specialized nature of an
agreed or consent judgment4 and modifies the application of the one satisfaction
rule accordingly.
This note is divided into four principal parts. First, the English legal history of
the one satisfaction rule and its counterpart, the release rule,5 is outlined. Second,
this note depicts the state of the law in Oklahoma prior to Kirkpatrick, in terms of
the application of the one satisfaction rule and the effect of releases on subsequent
suits. This helps to place the Kirkpatrick decision within a historical context. Third,
this note examines the rationale behind the rule and the need for modification of
existing law. Finally, the holding in Kirkpatrick is scrutinized in an effort to
determine the practical implications of the court's decision with respect to future
cases involving a release and satisfaction based upon a compromise and settlement.
1. 920 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1996).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21.
3. See Sykes v. Wright, 205 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Okla. 1949) (Halley, J., dissenting) ("The defendants
in this case reap where they have not sown, and are being relieved from possible liability when it was
not intended.").
4. Note that the court refers to agreed and consent judgments in synonymous terms, as judgments
assented to by the parties which may or may not be a result of actual adjudication regarding the issue
of damages, and which may represent merely court approval of a settlement. See Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d
at 126.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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II. The English Legal Roots of the One Satisfaction and Release Rules
Generally speaking, all individuals sharing responsibility for the commission of
a tort are jointly liable for that tort." At times, the actions of two or more
defendants may concur to produce a single, indivisible harm. In such an instance,
the parties producing the harm have been considered joint tortfeasors.7 Where no
concert of action exists, but instead the independent actions of two or more parties
cause the harm, the parties are known as concurrent tortfeasors.' In cases involving
concurrent tortfeasors, Professor Prosser, a respected authority on tort law, noted the
confusion surrounding the treatment of an injured party's right to redress where
multiple tortfeasors are jointly responsible for the harm.'
The confusion is largely a result of the American court system's adoption of and
adherence to English legal principles. Under English law, each joint tortfeasor was
liable for the entire damage which resulted, notwithstanding the fact that her actions
combined with those of another tortfeasor to produce the harm. Therefore, if the
injured party recovered a judgment, although unsatisfied," the party's claim is said
to have merged in the judgment, precluding the initiation of action against other
potential tortfeasors." In other words, a plaintiff could recover only one judgment
on a joint tort. 3 However, injury caused by tortfeasors not acting in concert with
one another would necessarily create two causes of action. 4 Consequently, an
6. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 160 (Archibald H. Throckmorton
ed., Callaghan & Co. 1930) (1879).
7. See William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 420 (1937)
[hereinafter Prosser, Joint Torts]. The author contrasts English law with the more liberal American view.
Under English law, cono.rted action between the parties was required in order to join the parties in the
same cause of action. By contrast, the American approach provided that defendants concurring to
produce a single harm could be jointly and severally liable despite the absence of concerted action. See
id. at 419-20.
8. See Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Wash. 1978).
9. See WILLiAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 297-300 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK]; see also Cynthia A. Sharo, Note, Knowledge by the Jury of a
Settlement Where a Plaintiff Has Settled With One or More Defendants Who Are Jointly and Severally
Liable, 32 ViLL. L. REV. 541, 543 (1987) (noting that independent acts of concurrent tortfeasors do not
fall under joint tort definition, yet courts have imposed joint and several liability on those causing a
single indivisible injury)
10. See Prosser, Joint Torts, supra note 7, at 414. Where concerted action existed among several
tortfeasors, the act of one tortfeasor could be imputed to the group as a whole. Consequently, each joint
tortfeasor was liable for the entire harm regardless of the extent of his involvement in the commission
of the wrong. See id. at 418.
11. Satisfaction is "the discharge of an obligation by paying a party what is due to him ... or what
is awarded to him by the judgment of a court or otherwise." BLACK'S LAW DIcrTIONARY 1342 (6th ed.
1990).
12. See Prosser, Joint Torts, supra note 7, at 421.
13. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 299 (stating that the law was amended in 1935).




unsatisfied judgment against one tortfeasor would not work to bar a subsequent
claim against another. 5
A separate English rule held that an injured party could receive only one
compensation for her loss, and satisfaction of a claim would preclude further legal
actions. 6 This rule was applicable to both joint tortfeasors, acting in concert, as
well as concurrent tortfeasors.Y Due to their similar nature, the American courts
have often confused the practical application of the two rules. 8
The widely accepted American common law view was that a judgment against
one of several tortfeasors which was unsatisfied would fail to extinguish claims
against other potential tortfeasors."' However, a satisfied judgment against one
tortfeasor acted to bar subsequent actions against others." This rule was deemed
the one satisfaction rule.' As Prosser noted, the rule has now become "involved
in the confused concept of joint torts'."'
Consistent with the one satisfaction rule, under common law, a discharge of one
or more joint tortfeasors acted to discharge additional tortfeasors.' Subsequent
suits were barred, despite the sufficiency of the compensation received by the
plaintiff.' The mechanism precipitating such an occurrence could manifest itself
in the form of a release' or an accord and satisfaction.' The American courts
have encountered difficulty in applying these rules, often confusing release with
satisfaction.' In the past, some courts have presumed that any amount paid for a
release constitutes full satisfaction of a claim, without regard to the intent of the
plaintiff. This apparently misguided application of the rules exemplifies the
confusion surrounding these issues.
The enduring rule that a release of one tortfeasor releases all has not been applied
without considerable controversy.' Courts have 'often strained to avoid the
15. See id.
16. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 299.
17. See id,
18. See id.
19. See JOHN D. CALIMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTs § 20-3, at 848 (3d ed.
1987); PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 299.
20. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 300.
21. See Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 124 (Okla. 1996). Note that American courts
have applied the rule to both joint and concurrent tortfeasors. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9,
at 299.
22. PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 300.
23. See CALIMARI & PERiLLO, supra note 19, at 851.
24. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 301.
25. A release is a writing or oral statement manifesting an intention to discharge another from an
existing or asserted duty. It is the surrender of a cause of action or the giving up of a claim one has
against another. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990).
26. See CALIMARI & PERtLLO, supra note 19, at 851.
27. See id.
28. See James F. Thaxter, Comment, Joint Tortfeasors: Legislative Changes in the Rules Regarding
Releases and Contribution, 9 HASINGs L.J. 180, 183 (1958).
29. See John H. Wigmore, Release to One Joint-Tortfeasor, 17 ILL. L. REv. 563, 563 (1923) (stating
that the release rule, which is derived from the one satisfaction rule, is "a surviving relic of the Cokian
1997]
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injustices associated with the release rule." Some courts developed exceptions to
the rule through judicial interpretation?' Other courts abandoned the rule altogether
through specific statutory schemes designed to curtail the harshness of the rule. 2
Prior to Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp.,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court strongly
adhered to the one satisfaction rule, relying on considerable precedent. 4 In
Kirkpatrick, the court takes a different approach and radically alters its position
regarding the application of the rule?' The following text outlines the court's past
and present views regarding application of the rule as well as its rationale in each
instance.
II. Strict Adherence to the One Satisfaction Rule:
Oklahoma Law Prior to Kirkpatrick
Case law prior to Kirkpatrick clearly demonstrates the overall significance of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Kirkpatrick. In order to fully comprehend
the Kirkpatrick court's rationale regarding application of the one satisfaction rule,
it is necessary to contemplate the reasoning promulgated in past Oklahoma
decisions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adhered to the rule for nearly seventy
years.' In 1928, in Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., the court first held that
satisfaction of a judgment against one of two or more joint tortfeasors extinguishes
the right of the plaintiff to file suit against other tortfeasors." The court's rigid
application of the nle over time has been described as nothing short of "mechani-
stic."39 The court has not wavered in its strict application of the rule in cases
involving concurrent tortfeasors. In Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, ' the court
relied upon its consistent prior application of the rule and barred a proceeding
period of metaphysics"); see also Thaxter, supra note 28, at 182 ("The rule has been a dangerous trap
for unwary litigants and attorneys .... [I]n many cases they have applied it with ofttimes harsh and,
perhaps, unjust results.").
30. See Thaxter, supra note 28, at 185 (denoting the California trend towards avoiding the release
rule whenever feasible).
31. See Richard E. Condon, Jr., Note, Releases of Tortfeasors -Adoption of the Intent Rule at the
Traditional Canons of Contractual and Statutory Interpretation - Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 14
QuiNmIAc L. REv. 529, 532-34 (1994).
32. See Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Release of One Joint Tortfeasor as Discharging Liability of
Others Under Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and Other Statutes Expressly Governing
Effect of Release, 6 A.L.R.5TH 883, 914 (1992).
33. 920 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1996).
34. See, e.g., Cartwright v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Okla. 1972); Powell v.
Powell, 370 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Okla. 1962); Sykes v. Wright, 205 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Okla. 1949); City
of Wetumka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co., 43 P.2d 434, 436 (Okla. 1935); Cain v. Quannah Light &
Ice Co., 267 P. 641, 643 (Okla. 1928); Oachita Marine & Indus. Corp., 606 P.2d 607, 608-09 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1979).
35. See Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d at 133.
36. See supra note 34.
37. 267 P. 641 (Okla. 1928).
38. See id at 43.
39. Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d at 130.




against a potential tortfeasor where satisfaction of judgment was previously
recovered against another tortfeasor.4' Other decisions by the court have similarly
advocated the application of the one satisfaction rule, occasionally despite evidence
of obvious intent by the parties to the contrary.4
Likewise, the rule has been stringently applied even in cases involving settlement
amounts less than the amount for which the plaintiff has sued,43 thereby extin-
guishing subsequent claims against other potential tortfeasors. Thus, it is apparent
that the court's reliance upon the rule may have resulted in unjust consequences by
discounting the intent of the parties and perhaps depriving plaintiffs of the right to
full compensation for their injuries. The court has, however, attempted to mitigate
or avoid the harsh results of the rule where possible.
Oklahoma, like other states, has attempted to sidestep the one satisfaction rule
through judicial interpretation and legislative enactment. The court's maneuvering
has been particularly evident in cases involving releases given to one of several
tortfeasors. For instance, at times the court has distinguished between a release and
a covenant not to sue in order to create an exception to the release rule.4 In All
American Bus Lines v. Saxon,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a covenant
not to sue differs from a release and, unlike a release, it will not discharge other
potential tortfeasors.47 In other cases, the court has similarly suggested that a
release of one tortfeasor which contains a reservation of the plaintiffs right to sue
another tortfeasor should be deemed a covenant not to sue, thereby preserving the
subsequent claim.
In Moss v. City of Oklahoma City,49 the court interpreted the effect of releases
involving concurrent tortfeasors in light of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (UCATA). The court held that a release given to one tortfeasor
will discharge other potential tortfeasors only if named or otherwise specifically
identified in the release as persons to be discharged."' Recent modifications to the
Oklahoma version of the UCATA have further clarified the intent of the legislature
41. See id. at 1234.
42. See Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d at 127.
43. See, e.g., City of Wetumka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co., 43 P.2d 434, 436 (Okla. 1935). A
settlement amount which is less than the amount sued for may be an indication that the plaintiff has
failed to receive full compensation for her injury, and as a result, her claim has not been fully satisfied.
44. A covenant not to sue is essentially a promise not to sue, either permanently or for a limited
period. If the promise is one never to sue, it acts as a discharge. See CAUMARI & PERILLO, supra note
19, at 878.
45. See Frey, III v. Independence Fire & Cas. Co., 698 P.2d 17, 21-22 (Okla. 1985).
46. 172 P.2d 424 (Okla. 1946).
47. See id. at 428.
48. See, e.g., Hambright v. City of Cleveland, 360 P.2d 493, 496-97 (Okla. 1960); Dodson v.
Continental Supply Co., 53 P.2d 582,583 (Okla. 1935); Ham v. Interstate Bldg. & Loan Co., 188 P. 343,
346 (Okla. 1920).
49. 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995).
50. See id. at 285-86; Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832(H)(1)
(Supp. 1996). The Act provides for the effect of a release given to one tortfeasor with respect to other
potential tortfeasors.
51. See Moss, 897 P.2d at 286; Cotner v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 903 P.2d 878, 879 (Okla. 1995).
1997]
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with respect to this issue and have provided guidance to the court. 2 The
Kirkpatrick majority was asked to go one step beyond Moss and apply the same rule
to cases involving the satisfaction of an agreed or consent judgment. 3
Given the Oklahoma Supreme Court's aversion to changing the law without good
cause, the recently amended version of the UCATA, coupled with persuasive
authority in the form of other state court decisions, presented the Oklahoma
Supreme Court with a prime opportunity in Kirkpatrick to overrule existing law and
substantially alleviate the harshness of the one satisfaction rule in Oklahoma. As a
result, the holding in Kirkpatrick is quite significant. Analysis of the court's decision
in light of the apparent need for a novel approach to the application of the rule will
surely help to provide meaningful insight into Kirkpatrick's potential impact on
future cases.
IV. Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp.
As a minor, Jeffrey Kirkpatrick suffered injuries when he fell out of a moving
vehicle. The passenger door of the truck in which he was riding opened when the
truck turned a corn-r, resulting in the accident Kirkpatrick's mother filed a
lawsuit on his behalf against Ricky Tanner, the driver of the truck. The parties
subsequently settled for $10,000 and filed a release and satisfaction of judgment.'
The amount of the s.sttlement equaled the maximum amount of insurance liability
coverage provided for under Tanner's insurance policy.'
Upon reaching the age of majority, Kirkpatrick filed suit against Chrysler
Corporation, the manufacturer of the truck, alleging that defective design and/or
manufacture caused his injury. 8 Chrysler moved for summary judgment, conten-
ding that the release and satisfaction of judgment in the prior suit extinguished
Kirkpatricek's subsequent cause of action. 9 Chrysler argued that a judgment had
already been fully satisfied against ohe tortfeasor and, as a result, the one
satisfaction rule would prohibit Kirkpatrick from splitting his sole cause of action
and apportioning the damages among the concurrent tortfeasors.' The trial court
agreed and granted summary judgment for Chrysler, holding that the release and
satisfaction of judgment filed in the prior case against the truck driver barred the
subsequent suit because a satisfaction of judgment in regard to one concurrent
tortfeasor discharged all other tortfeasors.6'
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the
judgment was merely a court approval of a settlement on behalf of a minor.'
52. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
53. See Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 132-33 (Okla. 1996).
54. See id. at 124.
55. See id.
56. See id
57. See id. at 125.
58. See id. at 124.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 123.




Additionally, the court determined that only the driver was discharged from further
liability, based on the intent of the parties.3 The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the matter and subsequently agreed with the court of appeals'
opinion, concluding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.'
The precise issue under consideration in Kirkpatrick was whether a release and
satisfaction of a consent judgment entered against a concurrent tortfeasor in an
earlier suit would bar subsequent proceedings against other potential tortfeasors.
In Kirkpatrick, the court held that satisfaction of a consent judgment would not
normally discharge subsequent suits against other tortfeasors unless such others were
specifically designated as persons to be discharged.' The court reasoned that to
hold otherwise would stifle the intent of the parties and discourage settlement.'
V. A New Application of the One Satisfaction Rule
in Cases Involving Consent Judgments
In Kirkpatrick, the majority began its analysis by outlining the history of the one
satisfaction rule in Oklahoma and its relation to concurrent tortfeasors. The court
acknowledged the well-established rule in Oklahoma that concurrent tortfeasors
producing a single indivisible injury may each be held responsible for the entire
harm if the plaintiff is free from negligence." Applying this principle to the facts
in Kirkpatrick, the court concluded that Chrysler and the driver of the truck were
each liable for the entire injury suffered by Kirkpatrick.' 9 Neither party disputed
this fact.7" Accordingly, Chrysler noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
invoked the one satisfaction rule to bar subsequent proceedings against additional
tortfeasors in situations involving concurrent tortfeasors and satisfaction of a
judgment in regard to one tortfeasor.7" Additionally, Chrysler argued that in past
decisions the court has failed to distinguish between the effect of judgments
resulting from a compromise and settlement and those resulting from actual
adjudication on the merits.' Chrysler relied upon this precedent in contending that
the present claim against it should be discharged. 3
plaintiff, as in this case, there is no actual adjudication on the merits.
63. See id. at 125.
64. See id. at 126, 133.
65. See id. at 124.
66. See id. at 133.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 126 (citing Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613, 617 (Okla. 1980);
All American Bus Lines v. Saxon, 172 P.2d 424, 429 (Okla. 1946)); Garrett v. Haworth, 83 P.2d 822,
827 (Okla. 1938) (quoting Northrup v. Eakes, 178 P. 266 (Okla. 1918)).
69. See Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d at 127.
70. See idL at 127.
71. See Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 756 P.2d 1232, 1233-34 (Okla. 1988).
72. See Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d at 127.
73. See id. at 124. Based on this contention, Chrysler argued the following are irrelevant: (1) The
intent of the parties or the judge, (2) the amount of compensation received by the plaintiff, (3) whether
the amount of damages has actually been litigated. See id.
1997]
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Notwithstanding the current state of the law in Oklahoma, the Kirkpatrick court
concluded that the rigid application of the one satisfaction rule may be inappropriate
where an agreed or consent judgment based on a settlement is involved." The
court's opinion appears to be founded on the conclusion that the intent of the parties
should be controlling, despite the fact that this rationale flies in the face of
overwhelming precedent to the contrary.- For instance, in Cain v. Quannah Light
& Ice Co., the court reasoned that the intent of the parties was immaterial, stating
that "[t]he question l-ere involved is not a question of plaintiffs intention; it is a
question of her legal right to split her cause of action, to apportion her damage, and
to recover by separate actions separate portions thereof."' It is generally ack-
nowledged that the rule is equitable in nature and designed to prevent unjust
enrichment by the plaintiff through double recovery."
The cases following Cain have tended to base their holdings on the finality of
judgments, as long as the judgments have been satisfied. Upon full satisfaction of
a judgment against one tortfeasor, any subsequent claims against others have been
barred, without regard to whether the amount sought and received is equivalent to
the damage suffered by the plaintiff.' Scrutinizing this logic, it becomes apparent
that in cases involving judgments obtained without actual adjudication on the merits,
injustice may result.
The above discussion exemplifies the essence of the controversy in Kirkpatrick.
Kirkpatrick essentially dictates that although it may be possible and desirable to
receive full satisfaction without adjudication on the merits, such a result is not
necessarily always the case. "A judgment may under certain circumstances be a
settlement in fact and a judgment in name only."' Moreover, an agreed or consent
judgment may not constitute full compensation to the injured party and, accordingly,
fail to fully satisfy the plaintiffs claim. It follows then that an examination of the
intent of the parties is a critical step in determining whether full satisfaction has
occurred.
The Kirkpatrick court considered two distinct types of intent: (1) the intent of the
parties that the compensation received should represent full and complete
satisfaction of the claim and (2) the intent of the plaintiff to release additional
tortfeasors, including the defendant, from liability." Grounded in the court's
analysis of intent is a tacit understanding that the one satisfaction rule is premised
upon a fundamental notion that it is the satisfaction of the claim which extinguishes
74. See id. at 133.
75. See supra note 34.
76. 267 P. 641 (Oda. 1928).
77. Il at 643.
78. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 299.
79. See, e.g., Cartwright v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Okla. 1972) (citing Cain
v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 267 P. 641, 643-44 (Okla. 1928)).
80. MARTIN B. ADAMS & GLENN W. DoPF, PROVING AND DEFENDING AGAINST DAMAGES IN
PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION 1993, at 77, 465 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. H4-5169, 1993).




a subsequent claim, not the judgment itself.' Therefore, under the court's
reasoning, if the parties did not intend for a claim to be fully satisfied and it was
not in fact satisfied, subsequent claims should not be barred simply as a result of
a judgment rendered.
Further examination of the case law will help clarify the Kirkpatrick court's
decision to take a new approach to the one satisfaction rule when consent judgments
are involved. In City of Wetumka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co.,83 the court relied
almost entirely upon the reasoning put forth in Cain and held that the satisfaction
of judgment in a prior case precluded subsequent action by the plaintiff.' The
Wetumka court observed that a plaintiff has a right to settle and compromise and
receive payment from one joint tortfeasor without precluding action against
others. ' Yet the court noted that when a judgment has been rendered against a
joint tortfeasor and it has been satisfied in full, this releases all claims against
additional tortfeasors.' Significantly, although the Wetumka court barred the
plaintiffs subsequent claim on this basis, it did acknowledge that the claim must be
fully satisfied.' Given the Kirkpatrick court's reasoning that the judgment against
the driver did not represent full compensation, and as a result was not completely
satisfied, the two cases are not entirely in conflict with one another.
The majority's rationale seems to be in accord with a case previously decided by
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. In Biles v. Harris,' an accident in which the
insurer denied coverage prompted the injured plaintiff to sue her insurance agent for
the limits of uninsured motorist coverage. The court held that the insurer's payment
did not constitute full satisfaction of the judgment and that the adjudication of
$10,000 for the plaintiff was meaningful only as a ratification of the settlement. 9
Likewise, in Kirkpatrick, the settlement amount appears to be based solely on the
amount of the driver's insurance policy limits, as opposed to an agreed amount
intended to fully compensate the injured party. As a result, the same conclusion
may logically be reached.
Finally, Justice Halley addressed the former of the two types of intent, the intent
that the compensation represent full and complete satisfaction, in his dissenting
opinion in Sykes v. Wright.' The Sykes court held that judgment entered in a
wrongful death action for an agreed upon amount constituted a full determination
of the cause of action and, when satisfied, extinguished a subsequent claim.9 In
82. See Tulsa v. Wells, 191 P. 186, 191 (Okla. 1920) (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON
TORTS 159 (2d ed. 1888)).
83. 43 P.2d 434 (Okla. 1935).
84. See id. at 436.
85. See i
86. See id.
87. The Wetumka court concluded that the plaintiff had received full satisfaction despite the fact that
judgment was less than the amount of the suit. See id.
88. 521 P.2d 884 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
89. See id. at 889. In making this determination, the court reasoned that recoverable damages would
likely have been far greater than $10,000. See id. at 888.
90. 205 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Okla. 1949) (Halley, J., dissenting).
91. See ihL at 1159.
1997]
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his dissent, Justice Halley noted that while the plaintiff desired settlement to go to
judgment, there was no intention to satisfy the plaintiffs claim in full as to the other
tortfeasors.' As a result, he determined that the subsequent claim should not have
been discharged.93 Under Justice Halley's reasoning, the rule thwarted the plain
intention of the plaintiff to preserve the right to sue other potential tortfeasors."
In Kirkpatrick, the court similarly determined that the plaintiff did not intend for
his judgment and satisfaction thereof to fully compensate him for his injury. 5 The
court stated that althcugh the judgment was likely intended to be enforceable against
Tanner, the amount of damages represented only a compromised sum in the amount
of liability insurance coverage.' In effect, the majority accepted Kirkpatrick's
contention that the judgment was merely a court approval, or a memorialization, of
a settlementC in the nature of a friendly suit." In so doing, the Kirkpatrick court
rejected the rationale promulgated in Cain and the cases that followed it, which
disregarded the plaintiffs intentions."
In addressing Kirkpatrick's intent, however, Chrysler can point to the plain
language of the release and satisfaction of judgment which explicitly states that
plaintiffs and their attorney "acknowledge receipt of payment in the amount of
$10,000 from Ricky Tanner, and his liability insurance carrier, Atlas Mutual
Insurance Company, in full and complete satisfaction of all claims, causes of action,
and rights, previously asserted herein, for injuries received by Jeffrey Kirkpatrick,
both past and future."'" Observing this language, it appears that Chrysler has a
compelling argument. The release and satisfaction clearly indicates Kirkpatrick's
intent that the payment represent full and complete satisfaction of his claim.
However, in response, the court suggests that the language should be read in context
with the entry ofjudgment, which indicates that the amount received was being paid
as part of a settlement based on the driver's insurance coverage.' Read in this
manner, the court could rationally conclude that the broad language did not
represent conclusive evidence of an agreement to accept $10,000 as full compen-
sation for plaintiffs injuries."l
92. See id. at 1160 (Halley, J., dissenting).
93. See id. (Halley, J., dissenting).
94. See id (Halley, J., dissenting).
95. See Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 126 (Okla. 1996).
96. See id. (concluding that the judgment was, in fact, an agreed or consent judgment based on the
settlement between the paities). It should be noted that underlying such a statement was an assumption
by the court that the amount of damages awarded to Kirkpatrick was less than the damages fairly
recoverable as a result of his injuries.
97. See id. at 125.
98. The plaintiff contends that the fact that the petition, journal entry ofjudgment, and release and
satisfaction were filed on the same day indicates an intention only to approve the settlement and not to
actually adjudicate the issues. See id.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
100. Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d at 125.





The second type of intent examined by the Kirkpatrick court, the intent to release
additional tortfeasors, has become mistakenly intertwined with the concept of
satisfaction. At common law, releases were under seal."w The courts presumed
that a sealed release reflected full compensation and, as a result, it acted to
discharge other potential tortfeasors.'" The sealed release was later abolished in
most jurisdictions, but many courts continued to hold that the release of one
tortfeasor necessarily discharged all other potential tortfeasors. °s Some courts have
even held that a release of one tortfeasor is effective as against all other tortfeasors,
despite a statement in the release to the contrary.'"
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has generally repudiated this doctrine and now
holds that a plaintiff may release one joint tortfeasor from liability without releasing
all others.'" Yet, despite the court's treatment of releases, prior to Kirkpatrick, the
court's steadfast adherence to the one satisfaction rule endured. The Kirkpatrick
court revealed the court's apparent inconsistency:
We have ... allowed a plaintiff to do exactly what we prohibited in
Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co. - settle with one tortfeasor for a
specified amount of money without discharging other potentially liable
tortfeasors - as long as the settlement ended in a dismissal of the case,
rather than the taking of an agreed or consent judgment that would be
followed by a satisfaction of that judgment filed of record.'"
The distinguishing factor seems to be the satisfaction of judgment which is filed of
record. When an agreed judgment has been satisfied, the court has applied the one
satisfaction rule without regard to the intent of the parties." Yet, ironically, where
an agreed judgment is involved, an examination of the intent of the parties may be
essential to the determination of whether full satisfaction has actually occurred.
In interpreting the effect of the release in Kirkpatrick, the court relied primarily
on its analysis in Moss v. City of Oklahoma City."' In Moss, the court granted
certiorari to consider the effect of section 832(H)(1) of the UCATA"' on a release
103. See Prosser, Joint Torts, supra note 7, at 423; Condon, supra note 31, at 532 ("The sealed
release was an English practice that became part of American law .... ) (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 218 (1936)).
104. See Condon, supra note 31, at 532.
105. See id.
106. See Sunset Copper Co. v. Black, 217 P. 5, 6 (Wash. 1923); Clark v. Union Elec. Light &
Power Co., 213 S.W. 851, 854 (Mo. 1919); McBride v. Scott, 93 N.W. 243, 244-45 (Mich. 1903).
107. See All American Bus Lines v. Saxon, 172 P.2d 424, 428 (Okla. 1946) (holding that release
containing a reservation of the right to sue the other joint tortfeasor and dismissal of action for
consideration did not release other joint tortfeasor); Safety Cab Co. v. Fair, 74 P.2d 607, 609 (Okla.
1937) (finding that release executed upon dismissal of action only released parties intended to be
discharged); Bland v. Lawyer-Cuff Co., 178 P. 885, 889 (Okla. 1918) (holding that dismissal and
satisfaction of prior cause of action against two of several joint tortfeasors did not release the others
where release showed that it was not intended to have such effect).
108. Kirkpatrick, 920 P.2d at 129.
109. See i
110. 897 P.2d 280, 280 (Okla. 1995).
111. As it appeared when Moss was decided, the relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
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which specifically identified settling tortfeasors and contained broad boilerplate
language purporting to discharge "any other person, firm or corporation charged or
chargeable with responsibility or liability.".. The Moss court scrutinized the
language of the UCATA"3 and determined that the legislature intended to reject
the common law rule which "often resulted in an unwitting discharge of other
tortfeasors" and instead require a certain degree of specificity prior to discharging
non-settling tortfeasors."4 Significantly, the legislature subsequently amended the
relevant section of the UCATA to reflect the Moss interpretation. " ' The
Kirkpatrick court concluded that the general rule articulated in Moss was also
directly applicable to agreed or consent judgments where the issue of damages had
not been litigated." ' As a result, the failure of the release and satisfaction in
Kirkpatrick to specifically identify additional tortfeasors to be discharged justified
the court's decision to allow the subsequent claim against Chrysler.
Additionally, the Kirkpatrick court looked to other courts which have previously
recognized that application of the one satisfaction rule may be inappropriate when
the judgment entered is an agreed or consent judgment."' In its analysis, the court
placed considerable emphasis upon the holding of a Maryland Court of Appeals
case, Welsh v. Gerber Products, Inc."' The Welsh court held that the entry of a
satisfied judgment order against one tortfeasor did not extinguish subsequent claims
by the plaintiff against other concurrent tortfeasors." 9 As in Kirkpatrick, the case
involved an agreed judgment based on a settlement amount equivalent to the policy
limits of the driver's insurance coverage.'O The Welsh court reasoned that a
H. When a release, covenant not to sue, or a similar agreement is given in good faith to one of two
or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
1. It does not discharge any other tort-feasor from liability for the injury or wrongful
death unless the other tort-feasor is specifically named; but it reduces the claim against
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the conideration paid for it, whichever is greater ....
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832(H)(1) (Supp. 1996).
112. See Moss, 897 P.2d at 282.
113. Subsection (H)(1) of the UCATA was adopted in 1980 by the Oklahoma legislature. Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, ch. 109, 1980 Okla. Sess. Laws 196, 197.
114. See id. at 286 (r.dopting what is known as the "specific identity rule," which requires that the
intent of the parties be gleaned from the four comers of the release, and rejecting the use of broad
boilerplate language to release unnamed tortfeasors). But see Mussett v. Baker Material Handling Corp.,
844 F.2d 760,762 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that a broadly worded release was effective against unnamed
tortfeasors) (citing Brown v. Brown, 410 P.2d 52, 57 (Okla. 1966)). Note, however, that Mussett was
decided prior to the 1995 amendment to UCATA which mandated that other tortfeasors be specifically
named. Additionally, Brown was decided prior to the adoption of the Act.
115. See Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 132 n.7 (Okla. 1996) (discussing the 1995
amendments to § 832(H)(1) of UCATA).
116. See id. at 132-33.
117. See id at 130.
118. 555 A.2d 486 (Md. 1989). In Welsh, an infant suffered personal injuries when a van struck the
station wagon in which ho was a passenger. The child was sitting in an infant car seat which failed to
restrain him, proximately causing his injuries. See id. at 487.





consent judgment will not necessarily be the result of actual adjudication of the
amount of damages."' Therefore, in certain cases, the court must inquire into the
intent of the parties.' As the United States Supreme Court has stated:
A judgment entered with the consent of the parties may involve a
determination of questions of fact and law by the court. But unless a
showing is made that that was the case, the judgment has no greater
dignity, so far as collateral estoppel is concerned, than any judgment
entered only as a compromise of the parties."2
The Welsh court analyzed the one satisfaction rule under the issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel, doctrine. The court noted the modern view that a consent
judgment would not preclude litigation concerning the amount of damages unless:
(1) the issue had previously been litigated or (2) the parties intended preclusion of
that issue.'" Likewise, under Oklahoma law, issue preclusion is applicable to
cases involving issues which have previously been litigated and which are
"necessary or essential" to the prior judgment."2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's adoption of the Welsh holding in Kirkpatrick
directly supplants prior Oklahoma law. The court's decision indirectly acknowledges
the necessity for full and complete satisfaction of a claim prior to discharging
claims against additional tortfeasors. Where a judgment arises out of an agreement
between the parties, the court recognizes that the sole means of determining whether
full satisfaction has occurred is to inquire as to whether the parties have either
adjudicated the issue of damages or intended for the sum to represent full
compensation for plaintiffs damages.
In Kirkpatrick, no actual litigation between the parties occurred. Consequently,
under the Welsh standard, the next step is to determine whether the parties intended
for the settlement amount embodied in the agreed judgment to fully compensate
Kirkpatrick for his injuries. As previously noted, the settlement amount was
obviously a reflection of the limits of the driver's insurance policy. Because there
is no indication that full compensation was intended, Kirkpatrick's subsequent claim
against Chrysler should not be precluded under the issue preclusion doctrine.
The Kirkpatrick court also relied upon a federal court case in Texas, Daniel v.
Ansul Co., 7 which rejected the one satisfaction rule where a voluntary agreement
121. See id. at 488, 490.
122. See id. at 488.
123. United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1953).
124. "Under issue preclusion, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its
judgment, that issue may not be relitigated between the same parties or their privies in a suit on a
different cause of action." Wilson v. Kane, 852 P.2d 717, 722 n.23 (Okla. 1995) (citing Veiser v.
Armstrong, 688 P.2d 796 (Okla. 1984)).
125. See Welsh, 555 A.2d at 492.
126. See Carris v. John R. Thomas & Assocs., P.C., 896 P.2d 522, 528 (Okla. 1995). It should be
noted, however, that the Carris court distinguished Cain and its progeny based on their factual
differences, as Carris did not involve joint tortfeasors and was contractual in nature. See id. at 526.
127. 547 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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was involved." The Daniel court noted that an implicit element of those cases
applying the one satisfaction rule was that the amount of damages had been
judicially determined by a factfinder."' This element is not necessarily present in
cases involving an agreed judgment, which may merely recite the terms of the
settlement.
The Daniel court's analysis was rather significant because it acknowledged the
needless distinction between the treatment of a release and an agreed judgment
ratifying a settlement.'" In support for this contention, the court noted the
confusion surrounding the satisfaction of a claim and the release of a cause of
action, stating: .'satisfaction' is the acceptance of full compensation for an injury
whereas a 'release' is the voluntary surrender of a cause of action, which might be
gratuitous or given for inadequate consideration..'.' The statement emphasized the
need to treat a release no differently from an agreed judgment.' After all, the fate
of claims subsequent to either ultimately depends upon the degree of satisfaction
attained by the partj entitled to redress.
The Daniel decision may not have been directly applicable to Kirkpatrick'
because a Texas statute, concerning claims by minors, mandated the agreement
involved in the case.'" However, the decision was still pertinent to the issues
involved in Kirpatrick. Similar to Daniel, Kirkpatrick involved an agreed judgment
made on behalf of a minor, in the nature of a friendly suit.' In addition, the
plaintiffs in both cases presumably did not intend for the settlement to apply to
additional tortfeasors," although neither expressly stated this intention. Accor-
dingly, the Kirkpatrick court acted appropriately in adopting in large measure the
rationale promulgated by the Daniel court.
The latter portion of the court's analysis involves a comparison with the relevant
sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments. Although not binding on the court, both Restatements are instructive
with regard to the relevant issues in Kirkpatrick. The Kirkpatrick court's holding is
consistent with section 886 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that
the discharge of a judgment against one of several tortfeasors is to be treated like
a release or covenant not to sue given to a tortfeasor.'37 Accordingly, consistent
128. See id. at 8.
129. See id.
130. Referring to the court approval required for a minor's claim, the court stated, "This approval
is ultimately given by a 'judgment' but in every true respect, assuming there has been no actual trial of
the controverted facts, the case is in no way different from the situation where an adult plaintiff signs
a release." Id.
131. Id. (citing McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1971)).
132. See id.
133. See Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 131 n.6 (Okla. 1996).
134. See Daniel, 547 F. Supp. at 7-8.
135. See Kirkpatricl, 920 P.2d at 125.
136. See id. at 126.
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886 (1979). Note that the Restatement, like the
UCATA, abolishes the distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue. See CALIMARI &




with Oklahoma's treatment of the release rule, applying section 886 to Kirkpatrick
would result in the failure of the Chrysler claim to be discharged.
The court also finds support for its position in section 49 of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, which provides that when a person is injured due to the
actions of concurrent tortfeasors, she has a separate claim against each of the
tortfeasors'3 As a result, a judgment against one tortfeasor will not act to bar a
claim against other tortfeasors.3 9 Again, under this rationale, the claim against
Chrysler would stand.
Finally, under section 50(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the
drafters state: "(1) A satisfaction or release of the judgment, or covenant not to
execute upon it . . .does not discharge the liability of any of the other persons
liable for the loss, except: (a) [t]o the extent that the agreement may so
provide. .. ." As is plainly evident, the language contained in the section is
essentially identical to the UCATA language in section 832(H)(1) prior to the 1995
amendment.' Therefore, given the Oklahoma legislature's amendments to the
UCATA, if relied upon, the Restatement language would provide for the same
result.
VI. Impact of Kirkpatrick on Oklahoma Law
The Kirkpatrick decision helped to define the boundaries of the applicability of
the one satisfaction rule in Oklahoma. The court held that in the absence of actual
adjudication regarding the amount of damages, the satisfaction of an agreed or
consent judgment will not discharge subsequent suit against other concurrent
tortfeasors' 42 The court did, however, create two exceptions to application of the
rule: (1) when it is shown that the parties intended the settlement amount to
represent full compensation for the plaintiffs injuries or (2) when the satisfaction
of judgment names or otherwise specifically identifies the tortfeasors as persons to
be discharged. 43
The first exception, though seemingly logical, presents difficulties because of its
inherently subjective nature. It is apparent that in order to determine whether an
agreed settlement constitutes full compensation, an analysis by the court must
necessarily include an examination of the intent of the parties. In Kirkpatrick, the
court concluded that the agreed upon amount of the settlement was not intended to
fully compensate Kirkpatrick for his injuries, primarily due to the fact that the
settlement amount was equivalent to the driver's insurance coverage." For this
reason, the facts in Kirkpatrick may be more conducive to a determination of the
relevant intent of the parties. Yet, this begs the question: What will be the result
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (1982).
139. See id.
140. See id. § 50.
141. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
142. See Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 133 (Okla. 1996).
143. See id.
144. See iL at 126.
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in cases involving satisfactions of agreed settlements arrived at through other
means? The implicit subjectivity involved in assessing the true level of compen-
sation gleaned from one's intent will undoubtedly result in a lack of uniformity and
arguably excessive judicial activism. At least the court's prior adherence to the one
satisfaction rule left no doubts as to the outcome of a case involving a prior
satisfied judgment. However, despite these concerns, the Kirkpatrick court's decision
will surely prompt a fairer result more closely akin to that which the parties actually
intended.
The Oklahoma legislature has resolved the ambiguities associated with the second
exception to the Kirkpatrick rule, involving identification of parties to be discharged.
The 1995 amendment to the UCATA cured many of the ills associated with the
previous version of the law. With the modification, the legislature effectively closed
the loophole which was previously left open to the judiciary.4 The amendment
mandated the use of specificity in naming tortfeasors to be discharged. The
Kirkpatrick court further clarified the applicability of the rule first announced in
Moss and ensured the same specificity would be required in cases involving consent
or agreed judgments, where actual adjudication has not occurred. One result of such
a mandate is a reduction in the required level of subjectivity referred to previously.
Requiring a higher degree of preciseness in the drafting of written releases should
aid immensely in helping to effectuate the intentions of the parties.
It is noteworthy to mention that in one case subsequent to Kirkpatrick, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court continued to apply the one satisfaction rule to cases
involving agreed or consent judgments, as provided for under Kirkpatrick. In fact,
the court has even progressed slightly beyond Kirkpatrick in its modified application
of the one satisfaction rule. In Hoyt v. Miller, M.D., Inc.," the court recently
addressed whether two releases in satisfaction of a judgment filed in a prior action
barred subsequent suit against successive, as opposed to joint or concurrent,
tortfeasors' 47 The Hoyt court applied the standard announced in Kirkpatrick.4 '
As the Oklahoma Supreme Court previously noted, section 832(H) does not require
that the parties act in concert for the Act to be applicable. Rather, the tortfeasors
must merely have contributed to the same injury sustained by the plaintiff."9
Given the progression of the judiciary in terms of its application of the one
satisfaction rule, there is little reason to believe that the Kirkpatrick standard will
fail to be applied with regularity to future cases.
145. See supra note3 113-15 and accompanying text.
146. 921 P.2d 350 (Okla. 1996).
147. See id. at 351.
148. See id. at 358 (holding that Kirkpatrick is fully applicable due to the common liability among
the tortfeasors).
149. See Shadden v. Valley View Hosp., 915 P.2d 364, 369 (Okla. 1996) (citing In re Jones, 804





The Kirkpatrick decision represents welcome relief from the effects of an
inherently unjust rule. Proponents of the one satisfaction rule contend that it
prevents double recovery by the plaintiff. However, these individuals are mistakenly
relying on an antiquated and confused notion of the term "satisfaction." In
Kirkpatrick, the court finally clarifies and resolves the confusion which was first
acknowledged by Professor Prosser many years ago. The court's application of the
rule under the UCATA not only includes safeguards designed to prevent double
recovery, but it also assures that the intention of the parties will not be discarded
as immaterial.
While a consent judgment may involve an agreement in which one party has fully
compensated another party, such is not necessarily the case. The extent to which
the amount of damages compensates the injured party in the absence of actual
litigation is plainly a question of intentions. These intentions must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. Earlier decisions failed to recognize that the intent of the
parties could alter the extent of satisfaction realized by the plaintiff in cases
involving agreed or consent judgments. The Kirkpatrick court's application of the
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